I Did Not Want To Kill Him But I Thought I Had To:  In Light of \u3ci\u3ePenry II\u27s\u3c/i\u3e Interpretation of \u3ci\u3eBlystone\u3c/i\u3e, Why the Constitution Requires Jury Instructions on How to Give Effect to Relevant Mitigating Evidence in Capital Cases by Barron, Dave
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 4
2002
I Did Not Want To Kill Him But I Thought I Had
To: In Light of Penry II's Interpretation of Blystone,
Why the Constitution Requires Jury Instructions
on How to Give Effect to Relevant Mitigating
Evidence in Capital Cases
Dave Barron
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Dave Barron, I Did Not Want To Kill Him But I Thought I Had To: In Light of Penry II's Interpretation of Blystone, Why the Constitution
Requires Jury Instructions on How to Give Effect to Relevant Mitigating Evidence in Capital Cases, 11 J. L. & Pol'y (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol11/iss1/4
BARRONFINALMACRO3-27.DOC 4/1/03 2:30 PM 
 
207 
I DID NOT WANT TO KILL HIM BUT 
THOUGHT I HAD TO: IN LIGHT OF PENRY 
II’S* INTERPRETATION OF BLYSTONE,** 
WHY THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO RELEVANT MITIGATING EVIDENCE IN 
CAPITAL CASES 
David Barron*** 
“We were drowning and we wanted some kind of help.  
And when it’s that serious for God’s sakes,  
when you’re pleading for help, you have to give us something,  
we were reasonable people, intelligent people, making a very 
 difficult decision, asking for help.”1 
                                                          
 * Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). Textually and in short citation 
form, this case is referred to as Penry II. The first Supreme Court opinion 
concerning John Paul Penry’s capital case is referred to as Penry I. See Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 ** Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
 *** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., Boston College 2000. 
The author wishes to thank attorney Robert Brett Dunham for providing the 
insight and inspiration for this article and attorneys John H. Blume and Jerome 
H. Nickerson for exemplifying everything the author would like to become 
both as a lawyer and a person. The author also wishes to thank Professors 
Ursula Bentele, Michael Madow and Daniel Medwed of Brooklyn Law School 
for their advice and support throughout law school. Finally, the author wishes 
to thank the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their editorial 
advice, and my close friends of whom there are too many to name 
individually, for their support in everything and putting up with my obsession 
with the death penalty. The author also wishes to acknowledge all lawyers 
currently representing death row inmates. 
1 See Alan Berlow, A Jury of Your Peers? Only if You’re Clueless, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Death is unique because of its irrevocability.2 Therefore, one 
of the most important decisions a person can make is whether 
another individual should live or die.3 Although mistaken 
decisions could cost people their lives, throughout history juries 
have been free to impose the death penalty on any individual 
convicted of a capital crime who they believed deserved a 
sentence of death.4 Over the past thirty years, however, the 
Supreme Court has placed restrictions on who can be sentenced 
to death.5 In doing so, the Supreme Court clearly stated that only 
very serious crimes such as murder permit the jury to impose a 
death sentence.6 As a result, the Supreme Court imposed 
                                                          
WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at B1; Alan Berlow, Deadly Decisions, Juror 
Confusion, AM. RADIO WORKS (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Berlow, Deadly 
Decisions] (quoting Fred Baca, the jury foreman in the 1982 Texas capital 
murder trial of Bobby Moore), at http://www.americanradioworks.org/ 
features/deadlydecisions/confusion_print.html. Baca’s comments were made in 
response to his experience as a juror, particularly in reference to questions the 
jury asked the judge pertaining to the definition of mitigation. Id. These 
questions went unanswered throughout the deliberations. Id. This confusion 
resulted in Bobby Moore receiving a death sentence that he may not have 
received otherwise. Id. 
2 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (discussing the need for 
reliability in capital cases because of the finality of the sentence). 
3 See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383 (1988) (“The decision to 
exercise the power of the State to execute a defendant is unlike any other 
decision citizens and public officials are called upon to make.”). 
4 See Bureau of Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT. PRISONER STAT. 
NO. 32, Executions 1962-1963, reprinted in Hugo Adam Bedau, THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA 113-15 (Anchor Books, 1964). Between 1930 and 1944, 
New York, Georgia, North Carolina, Texas and California accounted for a 
total of 908 executions. Id. 
5 See generally THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau, 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1982) (discussing the evolution of the death 
penalty in the United States). 
6 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding the death penalty 
for rape unconstitutional on the basis that a death sentence is disproportionate 
to the crime of rape of an adult and, therefore, constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
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requirements that death penalty statutes narrow the number of 
people eligible for a sentence of death,7 and provide for an 
individualized sentencing scheme.8 An individualized sentencing 
scheme requires jurors, prior to sentencing a defendant to death, 
to consider both “aggravating” circumstances—factors making 
the crime worse9—and “mitigating” circumstances—factors 
                                                          
Constitution). But see State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1072 (La. 1996) 
(holding that “in the case of the rape of a child under the age of twelve, the 
death penalty is not an excessive punishment”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259 
(1996); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishment be inflicted”). The Supreme Court has held the death penalty 
unconstitutional for crimes other than murder. Compare Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that imposing a death sentence violated the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when the defendant merely 
drove the getaway car during a robbery and did not know of the violence that 
occurred in connection with the crime), with Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 
(1987) (permitting a death sentence to be imposed against someone who did 
not physically commit murder but either had the mens rea necessary to commit 
murder or acted with a reckless indifference toward human life). 
7 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (requiring that the 
circumstances permitting a sentencing body to impose a death sentence apply 
only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder rather than to every 
defendant convicted of murder). Under Tuilaepa, the Supreme Court required 
limitations on the “eligibility phase,” which determines who can receive the 
death penalty, but refused to require limitations on the “selection phase,” 
which determines whether an individual defendant receives the death penalty. 
Id. at 973. See also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (holding 
that “the use of aggravating circumstances is not an end in itself, but a means 
of genuinely narrowing the class of death eligible persons and thereby 
channeling the jury’s discretion”); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 
(1983) (holding that to pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme 
must “generally narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”); 
James R. Acker & C. S. Lanier, Capital Murder from Benefit of Clergy to 
Bifurcated Trials: Narrowing the Class of Offenses Punishable by Death, 29 
CRIM. L. BULL. 291, 297 (1993) (noting the “eligibility phase” and the 
“selection phase” as the two principle limitations on capital punishment 
legislation). 
8 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Individualized sentencing 
involves “consideration of the character and record of the individual offender 
and the circumstances of the particular offense . . . .” Id. at 604 (quoting 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
9 While the Supreme Court does not specifically define what constitutes 
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making either the crime or the defendant appear less heinous.10 
                                                          
an aggravating factor, the Court requires disclosure to the defense of what 
aggravating factors will be presented to the jury prior to the commencement of 
trial. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991) (reversing a death sentence 
because the defendant was not given sufficient notice that he might be 
subjected to capital punishment); see Louis D. Bilionis, Moral 
Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283 (1991) (providing a comprehensive analysis of 
individualized sentencing and the effect of Lockett upon the concept of 
aggravation and mitigation within the context of the death penalty). While 
aggravating factors have not been given a legal definition by either the courts 
or statutes, the term has been defined as “any circumstance attending the 
commission of a crime . . . which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its 
injurious consequences.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990); see 
Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand 
Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1995) (defining aggravating 
factors in common usage as anything that tends to annoy or bother another 
person and discussing the likelihood that jurors use the “common” definition 
during deliberations); see also, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1998). 
There is no exclusive list of what constitutes an aggravating circumstance, but 
the most common aggravating factors include the following: whether the 
victim was a police officer, was being held for ransom, was killed because he 
or she was to testify in a criminal trial or was tortured to death; or whether the 
defendant hired the killer, killed while committing a felony, subjected a third 
person to a grave risk of death, had a history of felony convictions or had been 
previously convicted of another murder. Id. 
10 See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (referring to mitigating evidence as “facts about the defendant’s 
character or background or circumstances of the particular offense that may 
call for a penalty less than death”). While there is no agreed upon legal 
definition of mitigating circumstances, the Supreme Court has construed the 
concept of mitigation more liberally than aggravation and allows almost 
anything to be presented to the jury as mitigation. See Bilionis, supra note 9. 
While mitigating circumstances have not been given a legal definition by either 
courts or statutes, the term has been defined as those circumstances that “do 
not constitute a justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which, 
in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the 
degree of moral culpability.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990). 
See also infra Part II (discussing mitigation in the context of the Lockett 
Doctrine). See infra Part III (analyzing jurors’ failure to understand the 
distinction between a common usage of the term mitigation and the use of the 
concept of mitigation in the legal forum). Some of the most common 
mitigating factors include lesser involvement in the crime, physical abuse as a 
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Nevertheless, in order for an individualized sentencing 
scheme to ensure that only the worst criminals are given the 
death penalty, the jury must know how to “give effect” to 
relevant mitigating evidence presented to them at sentencing.11 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to 
mean that a jury cannot be prevented from giving effect to 
mitigating evidence.12 Despite the Supreme Court’s unwavering 
dedication to the belief that a death sentence should be 
determined based upon consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances,13 cases such as Blystone v. 
Pennsylvania,14 as well as empirical studies,15 demonstrate that 
                                                          
child and mental retardation, as well as defendant’s age, poverty and a lack of 
a criminal record. 
11 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 789-90 (2001) (referring to 
“giving effect” to mitigating evidence in terms of deciding how much weight 
the mitigating factors deserve and considering mitigating evidence in assessing 
the defendant’s personal culpability for the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted). 
12 See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (holding that a 
death penalty statute cannot require juries to unanimously find the existence of 
mitigating evidence prior to considering whether the mitigating evidence is 
strong enough to spare the defendant’s life); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 
(1988) (holding that a death penalty statute cannot require juries to 
unanimously find the existence of mitigating evidence prior to considering 
whether the mitigating evidence is strong enough to spare the defendant’s life); 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (reversing the death sentence of a 
defendant who merely drove the getaway car during a robbery and murder 
because the applicable statute did not permit the jury to consider the 
defendant’s lesser involvement in the crime). 
13 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) (refusing to 
require jury instructions on particular mitigating factors, but reaffirming that a 
death sentence should be based upon a consideration of both aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances). 
14 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding a death sentence despite both the 
jury’s expressed confusion about the definition of mitigation and desire not to 
impose a death sentence). See also infra Part III (discussing confused jurors in 
capital cases). 
15 See, e.g., Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury 
Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701 (2000) 
(discussing juries’ lack of comprehension and suggesting ways to correct the 
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defendants may lose their life not for the crime they committed, 
but because the jury failed to comprehend the law and did not 
receive the guidance necessary to adequately evaluate mitigating 
factors. As a result, cases exist where the jury believed the 
defendant did not deserve the death penalty, but, nonetheless, 
imposed the death penalty mistakenly believing they either had 
found no mitigation or that the particular mitigating evidence was 
not legally sufficient to spare the defendant’s life.16 
In Blystone, the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, which 
requires a jury to impose a death sentence upon the finding of no 
                                                          
problem). The author points out that “[s]yntactic and semantic bars to juror 
comprehension . . . can be made more comprehensible by simplifying 
sentence structure and by giving additional information about the meanings of 
abstract terms.” Id. at 701; see also Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jury 
Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223 (1995) (discussing the reasons why juries impose 
the death sentence). 
Th[e] decision-making process is . .  
. governed by confusion, lack of understanding and even chaos. 
Jurors decide life-and-death questions laboring under numerous 
misconceptions about the utility and operations of capital 
punishment—sometimes unclear about the fundamental importance of 
certain kinds of evidence (including something as basic as whether the 
evidence is aggravating or mitigating). 
Id. at 1224-25; Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs—Capital Jurors Who Change 
Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 
70 IND. L.J. 1183 (1995) (discussing the reasons why juries impose the death 
sentence). 
16 Blystone, 494 U.S. at 312 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the 
jury’s repeated requests for clarification); see also Prelim. Pet. for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus for Pet’r Blystone, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. 
filed Mar. 28, 2000). The jury asked the judge if they had to impose the death 
sentence if they found no mitigating factors. Id. at 68-69. Arguably, the jury’s 
repeated questions demonstrate not only a misunderstanding of the law but 
also a feeling that the aggravating circumstance was not severe enough to 
impose a death sentence. See Stephen P. Garvey et al., Correcting Deadly 
Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 627 (2000) (discussing the jury’s ability to understand the law as stated 
in actual capital cases as compared with revised mock jury instructions and 
explaining the implications of the results). 
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mitigating factors but at least one aggravating factor,17 passed 
constitutional muster because the statute allowed the jury to take 
into account any and all factors about the defendant or the crime 
when considering mitigation.18 
Recent developments reaffirmed the notion that in addition to 
permitting juries to consider mitigating evidence, juries must 
have both the opportunity and the means within the law to 
consider and give effect to relevant mitigating evidence.19 In 
Penry II, the Supreme Court held that the mere existence of a 
statute or a jury instruction allowing the jury to consider all 
mitigating evidence is not necessarily enough to permit the jury 
to give effect to the relevant mitigating evidence.20 Despite this 
notion, nothing has been done to correct the continuing problem 
of juries sentencing defendants to death under the mistaken belief 
they have not found the necessary mitigation to spare the 
defendant’s life.21 
This note focuses on the effect Penry II has upon Blystone 
and subsequent cases, and discusses situations in which the jury 
either was confused about mitigation or expressed a desire to 
sentence the defendant to life in prison, but nonetheless imposed 
a death sentence. This note does not argue that the U.S. 
Constitution requires courts to give all capital juries specific 
instructions on the law of mitigation or how to determine when 
                                                          
17 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1998) (requiring that “the verdict 
must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one 
aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury 
unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any 
mitigating circumstances.”). Mitigating circumstances “include[] any other 
evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant 
and the circumstances of his offense.” Id. at (e)(8). 
18 Blystone, 494 U.S. at 304; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT § 
9711(c)(1)(iv) (1998). 
19 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (reversing defendant’s 
death sentence because the judge’s instructions did not permit the jury to 
consider and give effect to evidence of the defendant’s mental retardation). 
20 Id. at 793-96. 
21 Research has found no statutes that have been amended or adopted to 
address what should be done when a jury appears confused on whether they 
found any mitigation. 
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mitigation exists.22 Rather, this note argues that, in light of Penry 
II, the U.S Constitution requires that a jury receive instructions 
and guidance on what constitutes mitigating evidence and how to 
proceed once they have found mitigating evidence when the jury 
expresses confusion about mitigation or a desire not to sentence 
the defendant to death.23 
Part I of this note provides a comprehensive overview of 
death penalty jurisprudence in the United States, from Furman v. 
Georgia24 to the present, and includes a discussion of guided 
discretion,25 individualized sentencing and mitigation. Part II 
                                                          
22 See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1988) (holding juries do not 
have to be instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence or a particular 
statutory mitigating factor). But see STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE 
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 141 (2002) [hereinafter, 
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION] (suggesting revisions to the 
Illinois pattern jury instructions, to include providing detailed explanations of 
the concept of mitigation), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/ 
reports/commission_report/index.html. The high number of misconceptions by 
capital jurors demonstrates that instructing juries on the concept of mitigating 
evidence might be the better practice. See infra Part III (discussing both 
empirical studies pertaining to jury comprehension in capital trials and cases 
where the jury asked the judge for assistance in understanding the complicated 
terminology applicable in capital cases). 
23 Cf. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 272 (dealing with jury instructions when 
there is no evidence that the jury was either confused or desired to spare the 
defendant). The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on a judge’s duty to 
ensure that constitutional mandates for capital sentencing are upheld when the 
jury expresses either a desire to spare the defendant’s life or confusion 
pertaining to mitigation. See Berlow, Deadly Decisions, supra note 1 
(referring to comments made by Paula Hannaford of the National Association 
of State Courts). Arguably, juries misunderstanding instructions lead to 
arbitrary death sentences, violating Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
24 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (invalidating the death penalty in 
thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government by 
holding the death penalty as applied within the United States was 
unconstitutional because it allowed the sentencing body to arbitrarily impose a 
death sentence). 
25 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (describing guided 
discretion as directing and limiting the sentencing bodies’ authority to impose 
a death sentence in order to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious 
sentences); see also Lief H. Carter, Capital Punishment, in THE OXFORD 
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discusses the Blystone and Penry II decisions. Part III 
demonstrates, through the analysis of empirical studies, that 
juries often do not understand how to give effect to mitigation. 
Part IV analyzes the effect of Penry II upon the future of capital 
punishment jurisprudence. Part V provides a brief summary on 
what the law now requires regarding jury instructions pertaining 
to mitigating evidence and what can be expected in the future. 
This note concludes that juries must be given specific guidance 
when the jury repeatedly expresses confusion on either the 
meaning of mitigation, how to determine whether mitigation 
exists, or what to do when mitigation has been found. 
I. OVERVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE26 
Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government 
sanction the death penalty as punishment for certain types of 
murder.27 A moratorium on executions exists in two of these 
states,28 and two judges have held the federal death penalty 
                                                          
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (Kermit L. 
Hall ed., 1992). Guided discretion can be defined as “statutory sentencing 
standards to guide sentencing bodies in making capital punishment decisions.” 
Id. 
26 See Hugo Adam Bedau, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT 
CONTROVERSIES (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997) (providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the death penalty in the United States); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan 
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulations of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 
(1995) (analyzing Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence since Furman). 
27 For a complete, current list of state death penalty statutes, see Death 
Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). 
The states that sanction the death penalty are as follows: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wyoming. Id. 
28 See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION, supra note 22. After 
discovering that more innocent people had been released from death row than 
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unconstitutional.29 The other twelve states and the District of 
Columbia do not permit the death penalty.30 Currently, guidelines 
must be followed prior to imposing a death sentence.31 For 
example, a death penalty statute must narrow the class of people 
eligible for the death penalty,32 and a jury must be able to give 
effect to relevant mitigating evidence.33 These guidelines, which 
are relatively new developments resulting from an evolving 
interpretation during the past quarter century of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, 
                                                          
had been executed over the past twenty-four years, Illinois Governor George 
C. Ryan imposed a moratorium on executions beginning in 2000. Id. See also 
Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: Freed from Death Row, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). The 
problem in Illinois also plagues the entire country, as evidenced by the 102 
wrongly convicted individuals released from death row since 1973. Id. See 
also Press Release, State of Maryland Governor’s Press Office, Governor 
Glendening Issues a Stay of Execution in the Case of Wesley Eugene Baker 
(May 9, 2002) (staying one execution and stating an intent to stay all 
executions pending the release of a report detailing death penalty research 
conducted by the University of Maryland), at http://www.gov.state.md.us/ 
gov/press/2002/may/html/baker.html. 
29 See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). In light of developing forms of technology, Judge Rakoff held the 
federal death penalty violates the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution because the finality of the death penalty deprives death row 
inmates of the procedural opportunities to prove their innocence as mandated 
by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. See also United States v. 
Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002) (finding the Federal Death Penalty 
Act unconstitutional). 
30 See Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty 
Information, supra note 27. The states that do not permit the death penalty are 
as follows: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. Id. 
31 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that 
Georgia’s “threshold” death penalty statute dispels with the Furman concerns 
about arbitrarily and capriciously imposed death sentences). 
32 See supra note 7 (citing Supreme Court cases and secondary authority 
discussing class narrowing and individualized sentencing). 
33 Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
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are constantly expanding.34 
A. The Road to a New Error in Capital Punishment 
Jurisprudence 
Prior to 1972, the Supreme Court rarely discussed the death 
penalty in terms of cruel and unusual punishment.35 In 1972, in 
Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court’s changing view on both 
the gravity of the death penalty and the analysis that would be 
applied in future capital cases became evident.36 For the first 
time, the Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment to 
invalidate capital sentencing statutes for violating the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.37 The Supreme Court was 
sharply divided on the reason for invalidating the statutes. This 
resulted in each justice writing an opinion, making Furman one 
                                                          
34 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 586 (1978) (establishing the evolving 
standards of decency method for determining cruel and unusual punishment 
and reversing a death sentence when the state law prevented the sentencing 
body from considering evidence of the defendant’s lesser involvement in the 
murder); see also infra Part IV (analyzing the meaning of “giving effect to 
relevant mitigating evidence”). 
35 See Louisiana ex rel. Francis Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) 
(approving repeated electrocutions when the first attempt failed); Wilkerson v. 
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (approving public firing squads); Bedau, supra 
notes 4, 5 (discussing the history and evolution of the death penalty within the 
United States). 
36 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, the issue was the 
constitutionality of state death penalty statutes that permitted the jury to 
impose a sentence of anything from a brief term of years to death when the 
defendant had been convicted of either murder or rape. Id. 
37 Id. at 239-40. “If the death penalty is limited by the fourteenth 
amendment’s equal protection clause as are other laws in this country then 
selectivity based on unpopular defendants is unconstitutional” because 
imposing the death penalty on a particular class of people violates the desire 
for equality that was implicit within the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
Jason M. Schoenberg, Making the Constitutional Cut: Evaluating New York’s 
Death Penalty Statute in Light of the Supreme Court’s Capital Punishment 
Mandates, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 337, 345 n.43 (1999); see U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII (“nor [shall] cruel and unusual punishment [be] inflicted”). 
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of the longest Supreme Court opinions ever written.38 Moreover, 
the Court only addressed the statutes as applied rather than the 
constitutionality of capital punishment on its face.39 Despite the 
differing opinions, Furman invalidated all death penalty statutes 
throughout the country.40 
B. The Beginning of Modern Death Penalty Jurisprudence 
Within four years of Furman, many states rewrote their death 
penalty statutes.41 Accordingly, cases began to appear before the 
Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of three different 
types of statutes.42 The first type of statute, commonly referred to 
as a “weighing” type of “guided discretion,”43 requires the 
                                                          
38 Nina Rivkind & Steven F. Shatz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
DEATH PENALTY 44 n.a (2001) (stating that Furman took up 233 pages in the 
official reporter). 
39 See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justices Douglas, Stewart, 
and White each wrote concurring opinions in Furman in which they expressed 
their displeasure with the manner in which the death penalty was applied. Id. 
“Juries have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist 
that he die.” Id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring). “These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual . . . .” Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). “[T]here is no meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which death is imposed from the 
many cases in which it is not.” Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
40 See Bedau, supra note 5 (discussing the ramifications of Furman); 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26, at 371 (discussing the complexities of the 
Supreme Court’s death penalty doctrine since 1976). As a result of Furman all 
death sentences were commuted to sentences of life imprisonment. Id. 
41 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976) (addressing the 
constitutionality of the death penalty statute enacted in Georgia in the wake of 
Furman). 
42 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding 
mandatory death penalty statutes unconstitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding a “weighing” statute); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding a “threshold” statute); see also infra Part II 
(discussing the specific questions under the Texas death penalty statute). 
43 See Carter, supra note 25 (defining “guided discretion”). Twenty-three 
states have a “weighing” death penalty statute. See ALA. CODE § 13-A-5-39 to 
-59 (Michie 1994); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-48 (Michie 1994) (outlining weighing 
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sentencing body to find the existence of at least one statutory 
                                                          
provision); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-601 to -617 (Michie Supp. 1987); ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-603(2), 5-4-604 (Michie Supp. 1987) (outlining weighing 
provision); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1-.9 (West 1998, Supp. 2002); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1998) (outlining weighing provision); COLO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 16-11-103, -401, -401.5, -402 to -405, 16-12-201 to -210 
(West supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(2)(a)(III) (West Supp. 
1991) (outlining weighing provision); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a to -46b 
(West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-46a (West 2001) (outlining weighing 
provision); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, §4209(d)(1)(b) (Supp. 1991) (outlining weighing provision); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(b), (3)(b) 
(West 2001) (outlining weighing provision); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 
1987); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(C) (Michie 1987) (outlining weighing 
provision); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-6-1, 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 1991); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b) (West Supp. 1991) (outlining weighing 
provision); KAN STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (1994), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 
(Michie 1994) (outlining weighing provision); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 
(Michie 1996) (including weighing provision); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 
to -103 (West supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-103 (West supp. 1991) 
(outlining weighing provision); MO. ANN. STAT. 565-030 to -040 (Vernon 
Supp. 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (outlining 
weighing provision); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521 to -2534 (1989); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 29-2522 (1989) (outlining weighing provision); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
200.030-.035 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(a) (1991) (outlining 
weighing provision); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (Supp. 1991); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(IV) (Supp. 1991) (outlining weighing provision); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 
1995) (outlining weighing provision); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 
1998 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 
1999) (outlining weighing provision); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Lexis 
2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b)(2) (Lexis 2000) (outlining weighing 
provision); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03-.05 (West 1989); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1989) (outlining weighing provision); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.10-.15 (West 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21 § 701.11 (West Supp. 1992) (outlining weighing provision); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 9711 (1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(C)(1)(IV) (1998) (outlining 
weighing provision); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Lexis 1991); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g)(1)(B) (Lexis 1991) (outlining weighing provision). 
The statutory schemes of Oregon and Texas do not fit within the categories of 
weighing or non-weighing statutes but have been held constitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1997); TEX. 
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.01-.071 (Vernon 1992). 
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aggravating circumstance.44 Then, assuming the jury finds a 
statutory aggravator, the sentencing body must weigh the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances to 
determine whether the former outweighed the latter.45 The second 
type of statute is also a form of guided discretion but is 
considered to be a “threshold statute.”46  
                                                          
44 See supra note 9 (discussing the meaning of aggravating 
circumstances); see also infra note 47 (citing Georgia’s threshold death penalty 
statute and discussing the meaning of “statutory aggravating circumstance”). 
45  See supra note 10 (discussing the meaning of mitigating 
circumstances); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding 
the constitutionality of a “weighing” statute). 
46 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1997) (requiring a 
threshold showing of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance prior to 
permitting the jury to consider imposing the death sentence, but allowing the 
jury to impose a life sentence regardless of the consideration of mitigating 
circumstances). Thirteen states have a non-weighing, “threshold” death 
penalty statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2002); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (West 2002) (outlining non-weighing 
provision); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Michie 1997, supp. 2002); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1997) (outlining non-weighing provision); 720 
ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/9-1 (Michie 1993, Supp. 2002); 720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/9-
1(g)(h) (Michie 1993, supp. 2002) (outlining non-weighing provision); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1999, supp. 2001); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1999, supp. 2001) 
(outlining non-weighing provision); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 
(West 1984); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1992) 
(outlining non-weighing provision); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2001) (outlining non-weighing provision); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (Michie 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-
14(A) (Michie 1990) (outlining non-weighing provision); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-3-20 (Law Co-op Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-
op Supp. 1991) (outlining non-weighing provision); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Michie 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-6 
(Michie 1998) (outlining non-weighing provision); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
206 to -207 (Lexis Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4) (Lexis supp. 
1992) (outlining non-weighing provision); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 to -
264.4 (Michie 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 to -264.4 (C) (Michie 
1990) (outlining non-weighing provision); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
10.95.020 -.190 (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (West 
1990) (outlining non-weighing provision); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102 (Michie 
1988); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102(e) (Michie 1988) (outlining non-weighing 
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As in the “weighing” statute, the sentencing body is required 
to find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance,47 and it must consider aggravating and mitigating 
factors prior to imposing a death sentence.48 Yet, instead of 
weighing the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, a 
“threshold” statute permits the jury to spare the defendant’s life 
for any or no reason at all.49 The third type of death penalty 
statute made the death penalty mandatory for certain types of 
crimes, such as murder in the first degree.50 
In reaching a decision on the constitutionality of these statutes 
for the first time, the Supreme Court, in a one paragraph per 
curium opinion, held that “the punishment of death does not 
invariably violate the Constitution.”51 In reviewing the 
“threshold” statute and the “weighing” statute, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the concern in Furman, exemplified by 
Justice Stewart’s statement that the death penalty was “wantonly 
                                                          
provision). 
47 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Michie 1997) (enumerating the 
statutory aggravating circumstances in Georgia). A statutory aggravating 
circumstance is an aggravating circumstance that is specifically enumerated 
within the death penalty statute. Id. Non-statutory aggravating circumstances 
are aggravating circumstances not specifically enumerated within the state’s 
death penalty statute. Id. 
48 See GA.CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1997). 
49 Id.; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (per curiam) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a “threshold” statute). 
50 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977) (striking down a 
mandatory death sentence for the murder of a police officer); Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating a death penalty statute requiring 
the death sentence for a first degree murder conviction); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating mandatory death sentences for 
first degree murder); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) 
(holding a mandatory death sentence for an inmate convicted of murder while 
serving a life sentence unconstitutional). 
51 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69 (explaining that the reasoning behind the 
decision in Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was based upon the manner in 
which the death penalty was implemented and who was sentenced to death 
rather than a per se rule that the death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment). 
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and freakishly imposed,”52 would be resolved as long as the 
sentencing body was given “adequate information and 
guidance.”53 In analyzing how this could be accomplished, the 
Supreme Court suggested a bifurcated proceeding,54 which would 
allow the sentencing body to first determine guilt and then, 
assuming the defendant was found guilty, determine the sentence 
in a separate proceeding.55 
The Supreme Court reached a different conclusion on the 
constitutionality of mandatory death sentences in Woodson v. 
North Carolina56 and Roberts v. Louisiana.57 In invalidating this 
type of sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court realized the “need 
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 
                                                          
52 Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
53 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. 
54 Id. The twin objectives of consistency and individuality are “best met 
by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing 
authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence 
and provided with standards to guide its use of the information.” Id. See also 
Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information, 
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). The 
bifurcated system is now utilized in all states that permit the imposition of the 
death penalty. Id. 
55  Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty 
Information, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2002). Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska required 
the judge to determine the sentence, but this was recently held to be a violation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. See Ring v. 
Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana 
permit the judge to override the jury’s recommendation of life. See Death 
Penalty Information Center, Developments Related to Ring, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Ring. html#cases (last visited Feb. 5, 2002). 
It is currently unclear as to whether these override provisions are affected by 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring. Nonetheless, the Florida 
Supreme Court has stayed two executions, in light of Ring, to allow the court 
to hear arguments on the Florida override system. Phil Long, Florida Supreme 
Court Halts Two Executions, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 2002, at A1. 
56 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a statute requiring the death penalty 
for first degree murder). 
57 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating a statute requiring the death penalty 
for first degree murder). 
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punishment.”58 The Supreme Court held that a “mandatory death 
penalty statute does not meet the constitutional requirement of 
replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective 
standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable 
the process for imposing death.”59 
Furthermore, in Woodson, the Supreme Court took the 
reliability element of sentencing to a higher level when it 
discussed the concept of individualized sentencing.60 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that “mandatory death penalty statutes 
unconstitutionally fail to allow the particularized consideration of 
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted 
defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of 
death.”61 Thus, a mandatory death penalty statute for certain 
types of murder prevents the consideration of “compassionate or 
mitigating factors serving from the diverse frailties of 
humankind”62 and results in a “faceless, undifferentiated mass 
[being] subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”63 
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that mandatory death 
sentences would be inconsistent with the “fundamental respect 
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.”64 
C. Every Human Being is Unique: The Requirement of 
Individualized Sentencing65 
Individualized sentencing means that the sentencing 
proceeding should be based on a consideration of “relevant facets 
of the character and record of the individual offender” and “the 
                                                          
58 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
59 Id. at 303. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.; see infra note 6 (discussing the death penalty for crimes other than 
murder). 
63 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
64 Id. 
65 See Bilionis, supra note 9 (discussing individualized sentencing and the 
Lockett Doctrine). 
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circumstances of the particular offense.”66 Accordingly, if 
properly implemented, individualized sentencing would alleviate 
the problem of arbitrary death sentences.67 
This concept of individualized sentencing, first discussed as 
dicta in Woodson,68 did not have a major impact upon death 
penalty jurisprudence until Lockett v. Ohio.69 In Lockett, the 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute that did not 
permit the decision maker to consider as a mitigating factor the 
defendant’s lesser involvement in the crime.70 In doing so, the 
Supreme Court reiterated the need for a “greater degree of 
reliability when a death sentence is imposed”71 and handed down 
specific guidelines to ensure a death sentence is not applied in an 
“arbitrary and capricious manner.”72 These new guidelines 
require that the “sentencing body be able to [consider] as a 
mitigating factor, any [relevant] aspect of [a] defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense 
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death”73 in order to ensure that the death penalty is not “imposed 
                                                          
66 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (discussing the concept of individualized 
sentencing); accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (discussing the 
concept of individualized sentencing); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972) (discussing the concept of individualized sentencing). 
67 See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (discussing the importance 
of individualized sentencing in ensuring that the death penalty is not arbitrarily 
imposed). 
68 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding mandatory death sentences 
unconstitutional while also discussing individualized sentencing). 
69 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
70 Id. In Lockett, the defendant merely drove the getaway car and may not 
have been present at the time the robbery occurred. Id. 
71 Id. at 604; accord Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding 
the death penalty, as applied in the United States, unconstitutional since the 
death sentences were unreliable due to there being no way to distinguish those 
who were sentenced to death from those whose lives were spared). 
72 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601; see generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972). 
73 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; accord McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 
433 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
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in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”74 
As a corollary to this requirement, the sentencing body must 
be given the means to consider mitigating evidence.75 This 
ensures that the sentencing body’s “ability to consider . . . 
relevant mitigating evidence” is more than merely a goal that 
cannot be achieved.76 Thus, the sentencing body’s decision 
should focus on the individual defendant rather than the crime or 
the impact of the crime.77 
The individualized sentencing requirement adopted and 
expanded upon in Lockett has resulted in a large number of cases 
interpreting the extent of the Lockett Doctrine.78 In Penry v. 
Lynaugh,79 as a natural result of Lockett, the Supreme Court held 
                                                          
74 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605; accord California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 
(1987) (reversing a death sentence where the jury failed to address relevant 
mitigating factors in determining the sentence). 
[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant 
[as mitigation] because of the belief, long held by this society, that 
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, 
may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse. 
Id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
75 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (reversing a death 
sentence because the jury was not given the means to give mitigating weight to 
the defendant’s mental retardation). 
76 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. 
77 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that 
victim-impact evidence is admissible at the sentencing proceeding of a death 
penalty case not because of the impact of the crime, but to enable the jury to 
get a clear picture of what happened so that the sentencing decision will be 
more focused on the individual defendant). 
78 See infra notes 79-95 (discussing cases applying and expanding the 
Lockett Doctrine). 
79 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (reversing a death sentence because the jury 
instructions did not permit the jury to consider the defendant’s mental 
retardation as grounds to spare his life). Penry was retried by the state of 
Texas and convicted under the same statute, which was amended to include a 
supplemental instruction pertaining to mental retardation. Penry v. Johnson, 
532 U.S. 782, 786 (2001). Again, Penry’s death sentence was reversed by the 
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 804. See Harvey Rice, Penry Sentenced 
3rd Time to Die: Jury Rejects Argument for Retardation, HOUS. CHRON., July 
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that “[t]he sentencer must . . . be able to . . . give effect to [any 
mitigating evidence relevant to the defendant’s background or to 
the circumstances of the crime] in imposing [the] sentence.”80 
Therefore, the sentencing body must be “provided with a vehicle 
for expressing its reasoned moral response to mitigating evidence 
in rendering its sentencing decision.”81 
As a result of Lockett and its progeny, the sentencing body 
cannot refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence or refuse 
to give relevant mitigating evidence any weight.82 Similarly, the 
judge cannot prevent the defendant from placing relevant 
mitigating evidence before the jury.83 Finally, the Supreme Court 
has held that the sentencing body must also be allowed to 
consider non-statutory mitigating factors.84 
These expansive readings of Lockett have led to the 
presentation to a jury of myriad factors in an attempt to spare the 
defendant’s life.85 As a result, many courts have held that, under 
Lockett, the defendant cannot be prevented from presenting 
mitigating evidence bearing upon the defendant’s age,86 mental 
                                                          
4, 2002, at 1; Nightline (ABC television broadcast, July 11, 2002). The State 
of Texas sought the death penalty against Penry for a third time, and on July 
3, 2002, the jury imposed a third death sentence on Penry after finding he was 
not mentally retarded. Id. See infra Part II (discussing the facts and law 
pertaining to the two Penry cases). 
80 Penry I, 492 U.S. at 319. 
81 Id. at 328. 
82 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (reversing a death 
sentence where the sentencing body refused to consider mitigating evidence 
pertaining to the defendant’s unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance). 
83 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (reversing a death 
sentence when the judge refused to allow the defendant to offer evidence of his 
good behavior while in prison). 
84 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (holding that the 
requirement that the “sentencer not refuse to consider or be precluded from 
considering any relevant mitigating evidence” applies to non-statutory 
mitigating evidence, quoting Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4). 
85 See Bilionis, supra note 9 (discussing the impact of the Lockett 
Doctrine). 
86 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(reversing a death sentence because the trial court prevented the defendant 
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retardation,87 provocation by others,88 insanity,89 alcohol or drug 
usage,90 limited involvement in the actual homicide,91 neglect,92 
child abuse,93 poverty94 and a minor criminal record.95 
D. Recent Developments Pertaining to the Individualized 
Sentencing Scheme and Jury Instructions 
During the past decade, the Supreme Court started retreating 
from the principles of Lockett and handing down rulings that are 
                                                          
from presenting age as a mitigating factor while holding that executing a 
defendant who was under the age of sixteen at the time of the commission of 
the crime constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. But see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded violates the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and, 
therefore, overruling in part Penry I, which permitted the execution of the 
mentally retarded). In light of Atkins, a debate currently exists as to whether 
executing a juvenile remains constitutional. See Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 
24 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.). 
87 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part by, Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that that executing the mentally 
retarded violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment); see also Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (holding that 
juries must make findings of facts that could increase the sentence). In light of 
Ring, it appears as if the jury must both determine whether the defendant is 
mentally retarded, making him ineligible for the death penalty, and, in the 
alternative, whether a lower intellectual status not rising to the level of mental 
retardation constitutes sufficient mitigation to spare the defendant’s life. 
88 Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 621 (5th Cir. 1978). 
89 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414 (1986). 
90 Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1511 (10th Cir. 1987). 
91 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). But see Tison v. Arizona, 
481 U.S. 137 (1987) (permitting the death penalty for a defendant who did not 
commit murder, but either had the mens rea necessary to commit the murder 
or acted with a reckless indifference towards the crime). 
92 Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987). 
93 Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987). 
94 See generally Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
95 Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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less favorable to defendants.96 For example, the Supreme Court 
does not require the trial judge to instruct the jury with either an 
explanation of the terminology contained within the instructions 
or how to apply the principles of mitigation.97 This poses a 
problem for a confused jury because, absent an explanation, a 
jury that is unable to understand the instructions or does not 
know when it has found relevant mitigating evidence is incapable 
of adequately considering the mitigating evidence. 
In Buchanan v. Angelone,98 the Supreme Court failed to 
directly address the issue of what to do with juries that are 
confused about mitigation when the Court held that a capital jury 
does not generally have to be instructed on the concept of 
mitigating evidence or on a particular statutory mitigating 
factor.99 In Weeks v. Angelone,100 decided prior to Penry II, the 
Supreme Court again dodged the issue of juries expressing a 
misunderstanding mitigation. Instead, the court only addressed 
the issue of what the judge should do when the jury asks if they 
are required to impose the death penalty upon finding that an 
aggravating factor has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.101 
                                                          
96 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) (holding that a 
judge does not need to give specific instructions pertaining to the law of 
mitigation when there is no reason to believe that the instruction is necessary). 
97 See id. at 272. 
98 522 U.S. 269 (1998). 
99 Id. at 272. 
100 528 U.S. 225 (2000). 
101 Id. at 234. The existence of an aggravating factor is never sufficient in 
itself to sentence a person to death. Cf. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 
972 (1994) (ruling that aggravating factors are those that only apply to a 
subclass of defendants and thus narrow the class of people eligible for the 
death sentence); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (holding that 
“the use of aggravating circumstances is not an end in itself, but a means of 
genuinely narrowing the class of death eligible persons and thereby channeling 
the jury’s discretion”). Nevertheless, many jurors believe the existence of an 
aggravating circumstance requires the defendant to be sentenced to death. See 
William S. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview 
of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1091 (1995) (finding that many jurors 
“believed that they were required to impose the death penalty if they found 
that the crime was heinous, vile or depraved”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., 
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Despite the jury’s obvious misunderstanding of the law,102 the 
Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not err by merely 
referring the jury back to the relevant portion of his original jury 
instructions since the jury “would have asked another [question] 
if it felt the judge’s response unsatisfactory.”103 Thus, the 
Supreme Court assumed that the jury was no longer confused 
because, unlike in Blystone, the jury did not ask any further 
questions. While Supreme Court jurisprudence pertaining to jury 
instructions in capital cases has not been favorable to defendants, 
the Supreme Court has determined that jury instructions violate 
the principles of individualized sentencing established in Lockett 
when “there [is a] reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . applied 
the instruction in a way that prevented consideration of 
constitutionally relevant [mitigating] evidence.”104 
II. CASE LAW PERTAINING TO GIVING EFFECT TO RELEVANT 
MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
During the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has begun 
addressing what it means to consider evidence in the sentencing 
                                                          
Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. 
REV. 339, 360 (1996) (stating that “[n]early one-third of jurors were under the 
mistaken impression that the law required a death sentence if they found 
heinousness or dangerousness”); William S. Geiner & Jonathan Amsterdam, 
Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death 
Penalty Trials, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 41 (1989) (finding a significant number 
of jurors in death penalty cases believed that the death penalty was mandatory 
or presumed for first degree murder). 
102 See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972 (holding that aggravating factors are 
necessary to impose the death penalty and, therefore, perform the required 
narrowing function, but are not enough, alone, to impose a death sentence). 
Therefore, the finding of an aggravating circumstance is not enough, in itself, 
to justify a death sentence. Cf. id.; see also, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 
877 (1983) (holding that to pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing 
scheme must “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty”). 
103 Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234, 236. 
104 Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). 
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phase of a capital murder trial.105 The Supreme Court eventually 
reached the conclusion that the word “consider” means the jury 
must not only weigh the mitigating evidence in their decision, but 
also must have a “vehicle” for giving effect to this mitigating 
evidence.106 Defining exactly what is meant by a “vehicle” for 
giving effect to mitigation became the subject of two landmark 
decisions pertaining to modern death penalty jurisprudence.107 
A. Blystone v. Pennsylvania 
In Blystone v. Pennsylvania,108 Scott Blystone and his friends 
picked up a hitchhiker and robbed him.109 Upon request, the 
hitchhiker failed to hand over any money.110 Blystone pulled over 
to the side of the road and took thirteen dollars from the 
hitchhiker at gunpoint. 111 After taking the money, Blystone then 
ordered the hitchhiker to lay face down and shot him six times in 
                                                          
105 See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see also supra note 74 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence). 
106 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329 (1989) (referring to “vehicle” 
as a way for the jury to obey the law and still determine that the defendant 
should receive a life sentence based on the mitigating evidence presented at 
trial). 
107 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (holding that a 
constitutional statute is not enough in itself to ensure that a sentencing body 
has an avenue to give effect to relevant mitigating evidence); Blystone v. 
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (holding that a statute mandating 
death if no mitigating circumstances exist gives the jury an avenue to consider 
relevant mitigating evidence because the jury must consider the potential 
mitigating evidence in order to determine whether mitigating evidence exists). 
108 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
109 Id. at 301. 
110 See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Pet’r 
Blystone at 64, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 28, 
2000). 
111 See id. There is currently a dispute over whether Blystone actually 
obtained any money from the hitchhiker and, therefore, whether the 
aggravating circumstance of committing the murder in the commission of a 
robbery actually existed. Id. Moreover, the jury never considered whether the 
taking of only thirteen dollars constituted a mitigating circumstance. Id. 
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the head, causing his death.112 
Blystone was charged with capital murder and represented at 
trial by a public defender.113 At the sentencing phase of trial, 
Blystone failed to present any mitigating evidence.114 
Nonetheless, under Pennsylvania law, the failure to present 
mitigating evidence does not preclude the jury from finding 
mitigating evidence.115 In Pennsylvania, the entire guilt phase of 
the trial is incorporated as evidence into the sentencing phase.116 
This means the jury must weigh any factors and evidence from 
the guilt phase along with the aggravators and mitigators 
presented at sentencing to determine whether the aggravators 
outweigh the mitigators.117 Then, if the jury finds at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
circumstances, the jury must impose a death sentence.118 
During the sentencing phase jury deliberations in Blystone, 
the jury asked for the definition of mitigation and was told that 
mitigating factors are commonly understood.119 The judge, then, 
                                                          
112 Blystone, 494 U.S. at 301-02. But see generally Mem. of Law in 
Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Pet’r Blystone, Blystone v. Horn, No. 
99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 29, 2000) (disputing many of the facts of the 
case). 
113 See Blystone v. Horn, Prelim. Pet. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6. 
Blystone’s lawyer was a part time-public defender with little experience, 
funds, or assistance. Id. Each of these factors affects the outcome of capital 
cases. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not 
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) 
(analyzing how the quality of representation determines whether a defendant 
receives a death sentence). 
114 Blystone, 494 U.S. at 306 n.4. 
115 See 42 PA. CONS. ST. § 9711 (1998) (defining, explaining and 
enumerating mitigating circumstances). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at § 9711(c)(1)(iv). 
118 Id. “[T]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously 
finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating 
circumstance . . . . ” Id. 
119 See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Pet’r 
Blystone at 64, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 29, 
2000). 
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reread the initial instruction, which did not define mitigation.120 
After further reviewing the evidence, the jury again asked about 
the definition of mitigating factors and more specifically asked 
the judge if they were required to sentence the defendant to death 
if they found an aggravating factor and no mitigating factor, to 
which the judge responded by rereading his initial jury 
instructions.121 Arguably, individuals who ask whether a 
particular act is required may not want to commit the act. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the jury’s question was based 
upon the hope of avoiding having to impose a death sentence. 
Thus, the jury may have been asking the judge to resolve the 
possible dilemma of either pretending to find the existence of an 
aggravating circumstance in order to impose a life sentence or 
imposing a death sentence when they did not believe death was 
the appropriate sentence.122 Since the judge neither explained that 
the desire to impose a life sentence may constitute mitigation nor 
provided any other guidance, despite the apparent desire to spare 
Blystone’s life, the jury sentenced him to death upon finding no 
mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance: he 
“committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.”123 
Blystone appealed his conviction, claiming that 
Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute improperly limited the jury’s 
                                                          
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 789 (2001) (discussing the 
presumption that juries obey the laws and the impossible task of asking jurors 
to choose between obeying the law as stated and imposing the sentence they 
believe is most justified); see also supra note 16. The bifurcated system 
employed in capital cases seems to prevent jury nullification from becoming a 
viable option in capital cases. The sentencing phase and the guilt phase are 
separate proceedings. Under this system, the jury determines whether a 
defendant is guilty of capital murder prior to hearing any potentially mitigating 
evidence. Therefore, a jury is not likely to find a defendant guilty of a lesser 
offense in order to avoid imposing a death sentence because the jury usually 
can impose a life sentence based upon the evidence presented at the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial. 
123 Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 302 (1990); see also supra 
note 111 (noting the factual uncertainties with respect to the Blystone case). 
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discretion by requiring the jury to sentence him to death.124 The 
magnitude of the claim and its potential impact upon the 
sentences of other death row inmates drew a great deal of 
attention,125 particularly after the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case.126 
In analyzing the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute, 
the Supreme Court compared the mandatory portion of the statute 
with the list of enumerated mitigating circumstances.127 The 
Supreme Court concluded that the statute permitted the jury to 
hear and evaluate all mitigating evidence because the “catch all” 
                                                          
124 Id. at 306. 
125 See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26 (discussing the 
complexities of modern Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence and the 
attention that is paid to death penalty cases). 
126 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
127 Id. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1998) (describing 
the circumstances under which a death penalty is mandatory) with 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. at § 9711(e) (providing an inclusive list of mitigating 
circumstances). 
Mitigating circumstances—Mitigating circumstances shall include the 
following: 
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal 
convictions. 
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance. 
(3) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired. 
(4) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress . . . or acted under the 
substantial domination of another person. 
(6) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct 
or consented to the homicidal acts. 
(7) The defendant’s participation in the homicidal act was relatively 
minor. 
(8) Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and 
record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense. 
Id. 
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mitigating factor permits the presentation of “any other evidence 
of mitigation concerning the character and record of the 
defendant and the circumstances of his offense.”128 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the combination of the “catch all” 
mitigator and the incorporation of the guilt phase of the trial into 
the sentencing phase of the trial required the jury to consider and 
evaluate the potentially mitigating circumstances in order to 
determine whether mitigating evidence existed.129 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court held that the mandatory aspect of Pennsylvania’s 
death penalty statute did not limit the jury’s discretion since the 
“catch all” provision afforded the jury a “vehicle for expressing 
its reasoned moral response to [the mitigating] evidence in 
rendering its sentencing decision.”130 As a result, the Supreme 
Court upheld Blystone’s conviction as well as Pennsylvania’s 
death penalty statute.131 
B. Penry I and Penry II 
In Penry v. Lynaugh,132 John Paul Penry, who was mentally 
retarded,133 was charged and convicted of capital murder for the 
                                                          
128 Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990); see also 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. at § 9711(e)(8) (allowing a finding of “[a]ny other evidence of 
mitigation”); infra Part IV (discussing the relation between Blystone and the 
Penry cases and noting that the “catch all” mitigator is merely a codification 
of the Lockett principle). 
129 Blystone, 494 U.S. at 308-09; see also supra text accompanying notes 
115-18 (explaining Pennsylvania’s death penalty scheme). 
130 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). 
131 Blystone, 494 U.S. at 309. 
132 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Penry’s conviction was reversed, resulting in his 
retrial, re-conviction and, subsequent, appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
133 Penry I, at 307-08. A full discussion of mental retardation and the 
death penalty is beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, 
that the Supreme Court recently held that executing the mentally retarded 
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that in light 
of evolving standards of decency, as exemplified by the growing trend among 
states to pass legislation barring the execution of a mentally retarded person, 
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brutal rape and murder of a young woman.134 At the sentencing 
phase, Penry’s lawyer introduced extensive evidence concerning 
Penry’s mental retardation and the abuse he suffered as a child.135 
Despite the Lockett principle that a jury must consider any and all 
mitigating circumstances,136 the Penry I jury was never instructed 
that it could consider Penry’s mental retardation and abuse in 
determining his sentence.137 Moreover, Texas law, at the time of 
the first two Penry cases, required the judge to impose the death 
penalty if the sentencing body affirmatively answers three 
statutorily required questions:138 1) “whether the conduct of the 
defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed 
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of 
the deceased or another would result;”139 2) “whether there was a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;”140 
and 3) “whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the 
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, 
                                                          
this country can no longer stand for the execution of mentally challenged 
individuals); see also Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Retardation 
and the Death Penalty (providing comprehensive information pertaining to 
mental retardation and the death penalty), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
dpicmr.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2002). 
134 Penry I, 492 U.S. at 307. 
135 Id. Penry was in and out of hospitals as a child and had an I.Q. below 
63, which resulted in part from severe beatings as a child. Id. at 307-09. 
Moreover, Penry was repeatedly locked in his room without access to a toilet 
for long periods of time and had scars from frequent beatings with a belt. Id. 
At Penry’s trial, the defense psychiatrist testified that “anyone with [Penry’s] 
I.Q. is always incompetent.” Id. 
136 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see also McKoy v. North 
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
137 Penry I, 492 U.S. at 310-312. 
138 Id. at 310, citing, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon 
1981 & Supp. 1989); see also infra infra note 151 (explaining the 1991 
amendment to the Texas death penalty statute). 
139 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 
1989). 
140 Id. 
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by the deceased.”141 Penry’s jury answered each of these 
questions in the affirmative and thereby required the judge to 
impose a death sentence.142 
Penry appealed his death sentence on the ground that the 
statute violated Lockett by not allowing the jury to consider 
relevant mitigating evidence.143 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and concluded that the three statutorily mandated 
questions did not adequately address the mitigating evidence of 
Penry’s mental retardation because a jury could reasonably 
consider Penry’s mental retardation as requiring an affirmative 
answer to one of the three statutory questions even if the jury 
desired to spare Penry’s life.144 Thus, in essence, Penry’s mental 
retardation could be construed as an aggravating circumstance 
rather than a mitigating circumstance.145 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the trial judge did nothing to correct this 
problem.146 The Supreme Court then held that “a reasonable juror 
could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing 
the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death 
based upon his mitigating evidence.”147 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court reversed Penry’s conviction.148 
In 1990, the state of Texas retried Penry and a jury found 
him guilty of capital murder for a second time.149 At the 
sentencing phase, Penry’s lawyer, again, offered strong evidence 
                                                          
141 Id. 
142 Penry I, 492 U.S. 302, 310 (1989). 
143 Id. at 313. Penry’s counsel phrased the issue by stating that Penry’s 
death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because “the jury was not 
adequately instructed to take into consideration all of his mitigating evidence 
and because the terms in the Texas ‘special issues’ [portion of the death 
penalty statute] were not defined in such a way that the jury could consider 
and give effect to his mitigating evidence in answering [the ‘special issues’].” 
Id. 
144 Id. at 320-23. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 320-28. 
147 Id. at 326. 
148 Id. at 323. 
149 Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
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of Penry’s mental retardation and child abuse.150 Despite the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Penry I, at the time of Penry’s second 
trial, Texas still employed the same three statutory questions in 
determining whether to impose a death sentence.151 In attempting 
to address the Supreme Court’s concern in Penry I, the trial 
judge told Penry’s second jury: 
You are instructed that when you deliberate on the 
questions posed in the special issues, you are to consider 
mitigating circumstances, if any, supported by the 
evidence presented in both phases of the trial . . . . If you 
determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, 
if any, that a life sentence, is an appropriate response to 
the personal culpability of the defendant, a negative 
finding should be given to one of the special issues.152 
After deliberating for more than two hours, the jury answered 
each of the three questions affirmatively, resulting in the judge 
imposing the required death sentence.153 
For a second time, Penry appealed his death sentence. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
judge’s supplemental instructions complied with the mandates of 
                                                          
150 Penry I, 492 U.S. at 307-11. As a child, Penry suffered from organic 
brain impairment and had an I.Q. hovering around sixty, meaning he had the 
mentality of a six-year-old. Id. at 308. In addition, Penry suffered numerous 
beatings, including instances where his mother beat him over the head with a 
belt buckle, resulting in brain injuries. Id. at 309; see also supra note 135 
(discussing the abuse Penry suffered as a child). 
151 See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(d)(1) (Supp. 1991). In 
1991, Texas amended its death penalty statute by repealing the third statutory 
question and adding: 
[I]n deliberating on the [statutory questions], [the jury] shall consider 
all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the 
punishment stage, including evidence of the defendant’s background 
or character or the circumstances of the offense that militates for or 
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. 
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 138-41 (enumerating the statutory 
questions employed in Texas death penalty cases at the time of Penry’s trials). 
152 Penry II, 532 U.S. at 790. 
153 Id. 
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Penry I.154 Prior to directly addressing this issue, the Supreme 
Court clarified its holding in Penry I by stating that merely 
informing the jury that they may consider mitigating 
circumstances is not enough to ensure that the jury also has a 
“vehicle” to give effect to mitigating evidence in determining 
whether to impose a death sentence.155 The Supreme Court then 
directly addressed whether the supplemental instruction satisfied 
the principle of Penry I as the Court had just clarified it.156 After 
commenting that an instruction inviting the jury to do something 
contrary to the instruction poses an ethical dilemma to the jury, 
the Court held that inviting the jury to disregard the law violates 
the constitution.157 Therefore, the mere existence of a statute or, 
in Penry’s case, an instruction allowing the jury to consider 
mitigation is not necessarily enough to grant the jury a “vehicle” 
to give effect to the relevant mitigating evidence, particularly 
when the statute restricts the scope of the jury’s consideration of 
mitigating evidence or confuses the jury about the manner in 
which they can use the mitigating evidence in determining 
whether a death sentence is appropriate.158 As a result, the 
Supreme Court concluded that, despite the facial validity of the 
Texas death penalty statute,159 under the circumstances 
                                                          
154 Id. at 787. 
155 Id. at 792. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 793. The Supreme Court viewed the supplemental instruction as 
the equivalent of instructing the jury to disregard the law since none of the 
three questions pertained to mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance. 
Id. at 799-803. 
158 See generally id. 
159 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the Texas death 
penalty statute despite the provision requiring the jury to answer three 
statutorily mandated questions rather than permitting the jury to weigh the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances or impose a 
life sentence at will). The Texas statute permitted the consideration of 
mitigation in answering the three statutory questions. See generally id.; see 
also, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Supp. 1989). Texas still 
employs the “special issues” questions as the means to determine whether to 
sentence a defendant to death. TEX. CRIM. PROC.CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) 
(Supp. 1991). 
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surrounding Penry’s case, a “reasonable juror could well have 
believed there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry 
did not deserve to be sentenced to death . . . .”160 Therefore, the 
court reversed Penry’s conviction for the second time.161 
III. STUDIES PERTAINING TO A JURY’S ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND 
AND APPLY RELEVANT MITIGATING EVIDENCE 
A backbone principle of the American justice system is the 
jury’s ability to follow and apply the law.162 Obviously, this 
principle is successful only if juries understand the instructions 
that the judge reads to them. There has long been concern about 
how a person with no knowledge of the law can follow the 
complicated language and rules stated by a judge.163 This concern 
                                                          
160 Penry II, 532 U.S. at 788, quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
326 (1989). 
161 Penry II, 532 U.S. at 796. The State of Texas decided to seek the 
death penalty against John Penry for a third time. See Michael Graczyk, Third 
Sentencing Hearing Set for Mentally Retarded Death Row Inmate in Texas, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Apr. 29, 2002. During the sentencing phase 
of Penry’s third trial, the United States Supreme Court handed down their 
decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), barring the execution of 
the mentally retarded. In light of this decision, the state of Texas argued that, 
despite evidence of childhood trauma and a low I.Q., there was little 
conclusive evidence to prove that Penry was mentally retarded, claiming that 
mental retardation could be faked. See Harvey Rice, Penry Sentenced 3rd 
Time to Die: Jury Rejects Argument for Retardation, HOUS. CHRON., July 4, 
2002, at 1; Nightline (ABC television broadcast, July 11, 2002) (discussing the 
recent prohibition against executing the mentally retarded while focusing on 
the Penry case, including interviewing Joe Price, the district attorney who 
prosecuted all three Penry cases). On July 3, 2002, a jury sentenced John 
Penry to death for a third time, thus, opening the door for a possible third 
Penry decision from the United States Supreme Court. Id. 
162 See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (discussing the 
presumption that juries follow instructions). 
163 Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on 
Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996) 
(discussing studies of juror comprehension from the Zeisel study in the early 
1990s and the Chicago Jury Project in the late 1950s). The Zeisel study asked 
specific questions pertaining to mitigation to potential jurors who were waiting 
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has become even greater now that juries are expected to 
understand and apply complicated schemes pertaining to 
mitigating and aggravating evidence prior to passing judgment 
upon the life of another human being.164 As a result, researchers 
have begun to undertake comprehensive studies to better 
comprehend the jury’s ability to understand the confusing law of 
mitigation.165 
A. Capital Jury Project 
The Capital Jury Project attempts to determine the extent to 
which jurors understand instructions in capital cases while also 
making recommendations for improving a jury’s understanding of 
the applicable law and instructions.166 A group of researchers 
from the Capital Jury Project interviewed 916 capital jurors in 
                                                          
in the courthouse. Id. at 225-29. The study concluded that 48% of jurors 
misunderstood the concept of mitigation. Id. at 230. The results of the 
Chicago Jury Project are reported in Harry Kalven, Jr., & Hans Zeisel, THE 
AMERICAN JURY (1966). See also Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate 
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Luncheon Address before the 
National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System 
(May 15, 1999) (acknowledging the problem of jury confusion, stating that 
jurors are “read a virtually incomprehensible set of instructions and sent into 
the jury room to reach a verdict in a case they may not understand much better 
than they did before the trial began”). 
164 See, e.g., California Pattern Jury Instructions, CA CALJIC § 8.85 
(1996). “A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does 
not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be 
considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness 
of the death penalty.” Id.; Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal, ILCS 
7C.06 (2000) (referring to mitigating factors vaguely by stating that mitigating 
factors are reasons why the defendant should not be sentenced to death); 
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal, OUJI-CR § 4-78 (2001). 
“Mitigating circumstances are those which, in fairness, sympathy, and mercy, 
may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability or blame.” Id.; see 
also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26 (discussing the complexities of current 
death penalty law). 
165 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 101 at 1044-45 (explaining the 
reasoning for undertaking the Capital Jury Project). 
166 Id. 
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eleven states.167 The overwhelming evidence resulting from this 
study demonstrates that juries do not understand the concepts of 
aggravation and mitigation, and do not follow the instructions of 
the court. 168 
As part of the study undertaken by the Capital Jury Project, 
jurors were questioned about specific aspects of mitigation.169 
Almost twenty-five percent of these jurors believed they could 
only consider the enumerated list of mitigating factors.170 Forty-
two percent of the jurors incorrectly believed they had to 
unanimously agree to the existence of the mitigating factor.171 
                                                          
167 Id. 
168 See William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital 
Sentencing: Juror’s Predispositions, Attitudes and Premature Decision-
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1477 (1998) (discussing how capital 
jurors disregard judges’ instructions by deciding the sentence prior to the 
commencement of the sentencing phase of the trial); Diamond & Levi, supra 
note 163, at 225 (finding that few Illinois jurors understood that they could 
consider mitigating factors not specifically enumerated by the trial judge); 
Eisenberg et al., supra note 101, at 360 (finding “[n]early one-third of jurors 
were under the mistaken impression that the law required a death sentence if 
they found heinousness or dangerousness”); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. 
Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instruction in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1993) (finding that “[t]wenty percent of the jurors on death juries 
believe that an aggravating factor can be established by preponderance of the 
evidence or only to a juror’s personal satisfaction”); James Luginbuhl & Julie 
Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 
70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1167 (1995) (finding that “[j]urors were confused about 
the burden of proof and unanimity was poor”). Only fifty-nine percent 
understood that they could consider any evidence they desired as a mitigating 
factor. Id.; see also James Frank & Brandon K. Applegate, Assessing Juror 
Understanding of Capital Sentencing Instructions, 44 CRIME AND 
DELINQUENCY NO. 3 (1988). A mock jury study revealed that juror 
comprehension of sentencing instructions is limited, especially with regard to 
mitigation. Id. 
169 See supra note 168. 
170 Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69. See Hitchcock v. 
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). This view held by the jurors violates Supreme 
Court jurisprudence requiring the sentencing body to consider non-statutory 
mitigating factors. Id. 
171 Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69. This belief held by 
the jurors is an incorrect application of Supreme Court precedence. See Mills 
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The most disturbing finding was that forty-eight percent of the 
jurors polled said they chose the death penalty despite conceding 
that the factors opposing the death penalty were stronger than the 
factors in support of the death penalty.172 Finally, more than 
twenty-five percent of those interviewed thought death was 
mandatory when it was not,173 and more than half failed to 
recognize situations in which life was mandated, such as where 
the jury failed to find the existence of any aggravating 
circumstance.174 
Pennsylvania provides an appropriate example. According to 
the Capital Jury Project, nineteen percent of Pennsylvania jurors 
interviewed concluded during the guilt phase that life 
imprisonment was the appropriate punishment for the defendant, 
although they later imposed a sentence of death.175 The juror’s 
admitted that their initial determination that life imprisonment 
was the appropriate sentence was based on the belief that the 
crime was not sufficiently heinous or gruesome to warrant 
death.176 Pennsylvania law allows a jury to impose a death 
sentence only if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances; therefore, a finding of a lack of 
gruesomeness could result in a life sentence.177 These jurors, 
however, still chose to impose a death sentence.178 This evidence 
demonstrates the point that juries fail to understand mitigation 
                                                          
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding that a unanimity requirement for 
mitigating circumstances violates the Lockett principle that the sentencing body 
must be able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence). 
172 Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69. 
173 Id.; see also Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms 
of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 1447, 1451 (1997) (stating that “[w]hen jurors are repeatedly asked 
whether they can follow the law and impose the death penalty, they begin to 
believe the law actually requires them to reach death verdicts”). 
174 Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69. 
175 See Bowers et al., supra note 168 at 1488, table 1. 
176 Id. at 1500. 
177 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1998) (requiring that a death sentence 
may only be imposed if aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors). 
178 See Bowers et al., supra note 168 at 1488-90. 
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and, therefore, impose a death sentence upon defendants jurors 
do not believe deserve to be put to death.179 
The bifurcated system is one proposed way of addressing this 
problem, since bifurcated trials are often employed to ensure that 
evidence pertaining to sentencing does not infect the guilt phase 
and that juries consider only the evidence presented at sentencing 
in determining whether to spare a defendant’s life.180 Even in this 
context, however, studies by the Capital Jury Project show that 
many jurors decide the appropriate sentence during the guilt 
phase of the trial.181 Thus, in addition to finding that jurors make 
uninformed decisions, the Capital Jury Project reveals they do so 
many times prematurely.182 
B. Additional Studies 
As evidenced by the numerous occasions in which juries have 
asked the judge to help them understand mitigation, a jury’s 
inability to understand mitigation is a common situation in death 
penalty trials.183 In many of these cases, juries either asked the 
                                                          
179 Id.; See also Mem. of Law in Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for 
Pet’r Blystone at 64, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 29, 
2000). 
180 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
181 See, e.g., Bowers et al., supra note 168, at 1477, 1488 (stating that 
interviews with capital jurors in 11 states revealed that almost half believed 
they knew what the punishment should be before the sentencing phase of the 
trial). 
182 See generally Bowers et al., supra note 168. 
183 See Berlow, Deadly Decisions, supra note 1 (quoting the jury 
foreman, Fred Baca). One of the most disturbing examples is the case of 
Bobby Moore. According to a post-trial interview with the jury foreman, the 
jury asked the judge to “tell them which evidence could be considered as 
mitigating, but the question went unanswered so often that they finally stopped 
asking.” Id.; see also, Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 424, 431 (Mo. 2002) In 
Deck, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a death sentence on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object when the judge responded 
to the jury’s inquiry regarding the “legal definition of mitigating 
circumstances” by saying, “any terms that you have not had defined for you 
should be given the ordinary meaning.” Id. at 424. The judge then denied the 
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judge to define aggravation and mitigation,184 or took it upon 
themselves to consult a dictionary.185 At least one Supreme Court 
justice has found this problematic because “mitigating evidence is 
a term of art, with a constitutional meaning that is unlikely to be 
apparent to a lay jury.”186 The majority of the Supreme Court, 
however, has held that aggravation and mitigation are ordinary 
words that do not have to be defined.187 
To further support the proposition that jurors do not 
understand the concept of aggravation and mitigation, researchers 
compiled a list of instructions from actual death penalty cases, 
along with questions asked by jurors while deliberating in capital 
cases.188 Based on this list, and in conjunction with general 
                                                          
jury’s request for a dictionary. Id. at 431. See also People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 
627 (Cal. 1989) (discussing the trial judge’s decision to respond to the jury’s 
inquiry about the meaning of aggravation and mitigation by reading the 
dictionary definitions of the terms), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); People 
v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1988) (discussing whether a judge, in response 
to the jury’s request for a definition of aggravation and mitigation, can define 
aggravation and mitigation by reading from Corpus Juris Secundum), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990); People v. McLain, 757 P.2d 569 (Cal. 1988) 
(discussing the jury’s request for a definition of aggravation and mitigation), 
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1972 (1989); People v. Hamilton, 756 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 
1988) (discussing the jury asking the judge to read them the definition of 
aggravation and mitigation on three occasions during deliberations), cert. 
denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989); State v. Jones, 451 S.E.2d 826 (N.C. 1998) 
(upholding a death sentence despite the judge reading to the jury the American 
Heritage Dictionary’s definition of “mitigate”). 
184 See McLain, 757 P.2d at 580 (upholding a conviction despite the jury 
requesting a definition of aggravation and mitigation to which the judge asked 
whether they wanted the legal or ordinary definition while telling the jury no 
legal definition of these terms existed); Hamilton, 756 P.2d at 1362 (upholding 
a conviction where the jury asked for the instructions to be read to them three 
times and asked for a definition of mitigation in layman’s terms to which the 
judge responded by reciting the definition from a legal dictionary). 
185 See People v. Karis, 758 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1987) (upholding a 
conviction despite a juror using a dictionary to obtain the definition of 
mitigation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
186 Watkins v. Murray, 493 U.S. 907, 910 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
187 Id. at 908-09. 
188 See Bowers, supra note 101, at 1044-45 (discussing the manner in 
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constitutional principles pertaining to mitigation, researchers 
posed questions to a random sampling of the population.189 The 
results were astounding. The first question asked whether jurors 
could spare a person’s life if they found a mitigating factor not 
mentioned by the judge.190 An overwhelming sixty-four percent 
of the people polled incorrectly believed this was insufficient to 
prevent the imposition of a death sentence.191 The second 
question used an instruction that was given in a capital trial in 
reference to a weighing statute.192 The people polled were asked 
whether they had to impose a death sentence if they reached the 
conclusion that the mitigating evidence outweighed the 
aggravating evidence, but felt they were unable to find a 
mitigating factor that was sufficient to preclude the death 
penalty.193 An overwhelming fifty-eight percent of the people 
wrongly believed a death sentence had to be imposed.194 
The statistical analysis discussed above and the responses to 
                                                          
which the data was compiled). 
189 Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1162-70 (discussing jurors’ 
inability to correctly respond to questions pertaining to the law of mitigation); 
see also Diamond & Levi, supra note 163, at 230-33 (discussing the results of 
the Zeisel survey); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving 
the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 
LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 153 (1982) (finding comprehension of jury instructions 
by college students generally poor); Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. 
L. REV. 77 (1988) (observing the low comprehension level of pattern 
instructions by people called to jury service in Texas); Tiersma, supra note 9, 
at 1 (discussing jurors’ ability to understand instructions given in capital trials 
by posing these questions to members of the population who had not heard the 
questions in the past nor served on a capital jury). 
190 Luginbuhl and Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-68. 
191 Id. All death penalty statutes and Supreme Court jurisprudence require 
the jury to consider all evidence offered in mitigation prior to imposing a 
death sentence. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that non-statutory mitigators, which 
normally would not be mentioned by the judge, can be presented to and 
considered by the jury. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). 
192 Luginbuhl and Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-68. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
BARRONFINALMACRO3-27.DOC 4/1/03  2:30 PM 
246 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
actual instructions and issues from real cases indicate a disturbing 
trend among juries in capital cases: an inability to follow the law 
that is based on a clear misunderstanding of what the law 
requires. That is, the Supreme Court has held that the presence 
of an aggravating factor is merely a threshold requirement to 
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.195 Nevertheless, 
many jurors erroneously believe a death sentence is required.196 
Furthermore, data suggests that the problem of jurors not 
understanding the law and not following jury instructions is more 
than an academic concern, because an overwhelming number of 
jurors “seem not to understand what they are to do with such 
evidence.”197 Moreover, in some instances, jurors “recognize that 
evidence in mitigation has been presented, but do not know what 
the law allows, or requires them to do with such evidence,”198 as 
was illustrated by more than fifty percent of jurors making the 
contradictory statement that mitigating evidence outweighed the 
aggravating evidence but was not sufficient to spare a defendant’s 
life.199 
IV. ELEVEN YEARS LATER, PENRY II ACHIEVED THE 
RECOGNITION BLYSTONE DESERVED 
Both the principles of American society and the United States 
Constitution are based upon the fundamental belief that the rights 
of an individual should be protected from the opposition of the 
                                                          
195 Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994); see also Steiker & 
Steiker, supra note 26 (discussing the threshold requirement to impose a death 
sentence). 
196 Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: 
Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; And Mitigation is No 
Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011 (2002) (discussing jury misconceptions 
about the sentencing phase of a capital case); see also, Bowers, supra note 
101, at 1091 n.32. (finding that “many jurors believe that the death penalty is 
mandatory” when an aggravating circumstance is present). 
197 Bentele & Bowers, supra note 196, at 1042. 
198 Id. at 1043. 
199 Id. 
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masses.200 For most of American history, however, this principle 
has not found its way into the criminal justice system.201 
Defendants were punished without any consideration of the 
reason why they committed the crime.202 Until recently, in 
determining the appropriate sentence, the sentencing body did not 
consider any aspect of the defendant’s life that would have made 
him less culpable.203 In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court began 
to recognize the inherent unfairness of imposing a sentence 
without considering the uniqueness of the individual defendant.204 
In an attempt to eradicate the problem of arbitrarily imposed 
sentences, the Court adopted individualized sentencing.205 Despite 
criticism that individualized sentencing is contradictory to the 
aversion of arbitrary and capriciously imposed death sentences,206 
                                                          
200 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 
1961) (discussing the need for the Constituion in order to protect individuals 
against the inherent problem of majoritarian government); see also Bedau, 
supra note 26 (explaining the reasoning for current death penalty laws and the 
high level of support for the death penalty in the United States in contrast to 
that of most of the rest of the world). 
201 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the 
right to counsel to the states and marking the beginning of the individual rights 
movement within the criminal context and the application of the Bill of Rights 
to the states). 
202 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) 
(invalidating the death penalty partly because the failure to consider why an 
individual committed the crime gave the jury untrammeled discretion to 
determine who would be sentenced to death and, therefore, resulted in the 
arbitrary infliction of capital punishment). 
203 Id. 
204 See id. 
205 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (discussing 
what has now become known as individualized sentencing when the Court 
referred to the necessity and requirement that a jury consider all “relevant 
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the 
imposition upon him of a sentence of death” and “the circumstances of the 
particular offense”). 
206 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 714-15 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (explaining why he no longer can reconcile the Lockett Doctrine 
with the concern over arbitrary sentencing as expressed in Furman); see Scott 
E. Sundy, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided 
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the Supreme Court has strictly adhered to its application.207 The 
Supreme Court, however, has failed to ensure that the 
individualized sentencing process is applied in a manner that 
guarantees the underlying principle that each person will be 
treated as uniquely individual human beings.”208 
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that the sentencing 
body must be able and willing to consider all relevant mitigating 
evidence at sentencing in order to avoid a sentence that is both 
arbitrary and capricious.209 This right is meaningless, however, if 
the sentencing body is unable or incapable of giving effect to this 
evidence in determining a sentence.210 Therefore, implicit within 
the reasoning of Lockett, in order for a death sentence to pass 
constitutional muster, juries must be able to understand and 
recognize mitigation and know what the law requires them to do 
with any mitigating evidence they have found.211 Unfortunately, 
many juries are unable to accomplish these tasks.212 
The problem of a jury failing to understand the law of 
mitigation was first presented to the Supreme Court in 
                                                          
Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1185 (1991) 
(noting that the choice between these two principles depends on choosing 
between the risk of a death sentence based on an arbitrary factor and the risk 
of one imposed because mitigating evidence was excluded). 
207 See Bilionis, supra note 9, at 283. 
208 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
209 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring the sentencing 
body to consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to 
imposing a death sentence); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
(invalidating Georgia’s death penalty scheme because the manner in which 
defendant’s were selected for the death penalty was arbitrary and capricious). 
210 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (requiring the 
sentencer’s guidance be channeled by “clear and objective standards that 
provide specified detailed guidance”). 
211 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-03 (2001); see also Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (establishing that new rules of criminal 
procedure cannot be made on a habeas case). Since this right falls within the 
principles of the Lockett Doctrine, it is not a new rule of criminal procedure. 
See Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Thus, the Teague Doctrine, which prevents 
creating new rules on a habeas case, has no impact. 
212 See supra Part III.B (discussing the jury’s inability to understand and 
adequately apply the principles of individualized sentencing). 
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Blystone.213 Although unique in many respects, this case is 
perhaps most interesting for what was missing. 214 Blystone’s 
lawyer interpreted the statute as unconstitutional on its face,215 
arguing that the statute mandating the death penalty prevented the 
jury from considering mitigating evidence.216 Instead Blystone’s 
lawyer should have challenged whether the jury was capable of 
understanding and recognizing relevant mitigating evidence along 
with correctly applying the law to the relevant mitigating 
evidence.217 Due to the manner in which Blystone’s lawyer 
presented the issue, the Supreme Court never had the opportunity 
to address the jury’s ability to understand mitigation and apply 
the law to any mitigating evidence that they found.218 
After Blystone, litigation focused on whether juries were 
permitted to give effect to relevant mitigating evidence, rather 
than whether juries were capable of giving effect to relevant 
mitigating evidence.219 Additionally, when the issue of what to do 
about juries that did not understand the law of mitigation was 
eventually raised, the battle appeared lost when, in Buchanan v. 
Angelone,220 the Supreme Court held that juries neither need to be 
instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence generally nor on 
particular statutory mitigating factors.221 In Buchanan, however, 
                                                          
213  Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
214 See supra Part II (discussing Blystone’s unusual facts and applicable 
statutory provisions) 
215 Blystone, 494 U.S. at 302. 
216 Id. 
217 Cf. id. Since Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute clearly required the 
consideration of mitigating evidence in order to determine whether mitigating 
evidence existed, the real issue was whether the jury understood how to 
consider any potential mitigating evidence. Id.; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 9711 (1998) (providing the requirements to impose a death sentence). 
218 See generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
219 See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). While the Supreme 
Court’s opinion addressed the broader issue this note addresses, the case was 
presented to the Court as dealing with whether the supplemental instruction 
pertaining to mental retardation permitted the jury to consider mental 
retardation as mitigating evidence. Id. 
220 522 U.S. 269 (1998). 
221 Id. (discussing whether a judge must specifically instruct a jury on the 
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the jury did not express confusion pertaining to the meaning of 
mitigation or a desire to not sentence the defendant to death.222 
Therefore, the Supreme Court again avoided dealing with the 
issue.223 
The Supreme Court finally dealt with the issue indirectly in 
Penry v. Johnson.224 Thus, the Court differentiated between 
Blystone and Penry II. Despite the different results in the cases, 
the two cases are not inconsistent. Blystone merely addressed a 
facial challenge to a death penalty statute on the basis that the 
statute prevented the jury from considering mitigation.225 As 
such, Blystone was correctly decided because the statute required 
the jury to conclude, prior to imposing a death sentence, that 
mitigation either did or did not exist. Therefore, in determining 
that there was no valid mitigating evidence in support of 
Blystone, the jury had to consider the evidence presented at the 
guilt/innocence phase before considering any evidence presented 
at the sentencing phase.226 Thus, the Supreme Court correctly 
concluded that, on its face, the Pennsylvania statute met the 
constitutional mandate of Lockett. 227 
The Supreme Court, however, was unable to build upon the 
reasoning of Blystone in Penry II because the latter case raised an 
“as applied” statutory challenge based on the Lockett principle.228 
                                                          
law of mitigation when the jury has not expressed any confusion nor asked for 
an instruction on mitigation). 
222 See id. 
223 See generally id. 
224 532 U.S. 782 (2001). Research has found that the number of cases 
raising issues pertaining to confused juries drastically decreased after 
Buchanan. 
225 See generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
226 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711. This statute, which was at issue in 
Blystone, requires the entire guilt/innocence phase of the trial to be 
incorporated into the sentencing phase. Thus, any aspect of the guilt/innocence 
phase of trial could be considered sufficient mitigation to spare the defendant’s 
life. Id. 
227 See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
228 See generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Penry 
v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
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Lockett stood for the principle that juries cannot be prevented 
from considering mitigating evidence, and must be willing and 
capable of considering mitigating evidence during the sentencing 
phase in order to ensure that each defendant receives an 
individualized sentence.229 Thus, analysis under Lockett is a three 
step process.230 First, the defendant must be permitted to present 
all mitigating evidence.231 Second, the jury must be permitted to 
consider the mitigating evidence.232 Third, the jury must be able 
to understand and recognize mitigation while also knowing what 
the law requires them to do with the mitigating evidence once 
they have found it.233 The first two aspects, but not the third, 
were addressed adequately in Blystone.234 The third step of the 
Lockett principle, however, was at issue in Penry II.235 
As in Blystone, the Penry II jury had to consider the 
mitigating evidence presented at both the guilt phase and 
sentencing phase in order to determine whether mitigating 
circumstances existed.236 As a result, the Texas death penalty 
statute, on its face, permitted the consideration of mitigating 
evidence, so the statute could not be considered unconstitutional 
across the board. The Supreme Court, however, did not end its 
analysis of the Texas death penalty statute here. Instead, the 
Supreme Court addressed the statute as it was applied to Penry’s 
                                                          
229 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see also Part I(C) (discussing 
the Lockett Doctrine). 
230 See generally Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
231 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (reversing a death 
sentence because the judge refused to allow the defendant to offer evidence of 
his good behavior while in prison). 
232 Id. (holding that the sentencing body cannot be precluded from 
considering any mitigating evidence). 
233 Cf. Penry II, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (reversing a death sentence because 
the jury was not clearly instructed on what sentence could be imposed if the 
jury found the defendant’s mental retardation mitigating). 
234 See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (holding that 
the Pennsylvania death penalty statute permitted the defendant to present and 
the jury to hear all relevant mitigating evidence). 
235 See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 803-04. 
236 See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (enumerating the 
procedures in a capital case). 
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specific characteristics, particularly his mental retardation.237 As 
a result, in Penry II, the Supreme Court was able to reach the 
correct conclusion under Lockett without having to overturn 
Blystone.238 
While admitting that the Texas death penalty statute, on its 
face, was constitutional, the Supreme Court recognized that 
Lockett’s mandate that the jury be permitted to hear relevant 
mitigating evidence is rendered meaningless when the jury is 
unable to give effect to the mitigating evidence that is 
presented.239 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that death 
penalty statutes permitting the jury to consider all mitigating 
evidence are still unconstitutional under Lockett when a 
“reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no 
vehicle for expressing the view that [the defendant] did not 
deserve to be sentenced to death.”240 Thus, Penry II confirmed 
that challenges to a death sentence on the basis of the jury’s 
consideration of mitigating evidence must be addressed under the 
three-prong test discussed supra.241 
In order to satisfy the requirement set forth in Penry II, the 
jury must be able to understand the law of mitigation, recognize 
mitigating evidence when it is presented, and know what the law 
requires them to do with this evidence once they have found it.242 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyze each individual juror to 
ensure the ability to accomplish these tasks. Therefore, the 
system necessarily operates under the presumption that juries 
understand the law as explained to them by the judge, including 
the instructions pertaining to mitigation.243 As the statistical 
                                                          
237 See Penry II, 532 U.S. 803-04. 
238 Id.; see also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Arguably, the Supreme Court would have 
reached the same conclusion in Blystone as it did in Penry II if the statute was 
addressed as applied to the defendant rather than as a facial challenge. 
239 See Penry II, 532 U.S. 803-04. 
240 Id. at 791. 
241 Id.; see also supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text (discussing the 
three-prong test). 
242 See generally Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
243 See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (discussing the 
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analysis discussed in Part III of this note illustrates, though, 
many jurors are confused about the law of mitigation.244 
Admittedly, this problem is not easily remedied. Penry II, 
however, mandates that this problem be addressed when a juror 
has either expressly or impliedly indicated that he or she does not 
have a strong enough understanding of mitigation to ensure they 
impose a sentence that complies with constitutional mandates.245 
At a minimum, to ensure that the defendant’s death sentence is 
constitutional under Penry II, judges must give specific guidance 
to juries who express confusion on the law of mitigation.246 Only 
this safeguard will protect a defendant from an erroneous 
sentence due to a juror’s mistaken belief that they had not found 
mitigation where mitigating evidence actually existed. 
CONCLUSION 
During the past thirty-five years, death sentences have been 
called into question at an alarming rate.247 Thus, every effort 
should be made to ensure that the death penalty is more reliable 
at preventing people who do not deserve to be sentenced to death 
from receiving a death sentence. As was demonstrated by the 
                                                          
presumption that juries follow instructions). 
244 See supra Part III (discussing juror confusion). 
245 Penry II, 532 U.S. at 803-04. 
246 See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (holding that all findings 
of fact that could enhance a defendant’s sentence must be made by the jury). 
The importance of juries understanding mitigating evidence and correctly 
applying the law to the facts should take on greater significance in light of this 
United States Supreme Court’s ruling that juries must make findings of fact in 
capital cases. 
247 See James Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital 
Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1846-50 (2000) (discussing the 
extremely high error rate in capital cases and the underlying reasons behind 
these errors). Almost two-thirds of all death sentences are reversed either on 
direct appeal or in collateral post-conviction proceedings. Id.; see also` United 
States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding the 
federal death penalty unconstitutional in light of the likelihood that an innocent 
person could be sentenced to death and precluded from establishing his 
innocence). 
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empirical studies discussed in Part III, juries’ inability to 
understand the law of mitigation strongly contributes to the 
number of invalid death sentences. Therefore, requiring a judge 
to provide guidance to juries that are confused about the law of 
mitigation would substantially decrease the number of defendants 
wrongfully sentenced to death. These instructions are only one of 
many improvements within the criminal justice system that are 
necessary to ensure that an individual gets a fair trial. In light of 
the gravity and irreversibility of correcting a wrong sentence 
once an individual has been executed, however, this minimum 
safeguard must be employed. As long as the government 
continues to sanction the death penalty and allow the criminal 
justice system to take a person’s life, it is certainly not too much 
to ask that these judicially-imposed safeguards be properly 
applied. 
 
